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BOOK REVIEWS
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS. By William M. Beaney.
of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor: 1955. Pp. 268.

University

For many years to come, jurists and political scientists will be greatly indebted to
Professor Beaney of Princeton University for his comprehensive study of one of
America's most important procedural rights, the right to counsel. In The Right to
Counsel in American Courts, the author approaches the object of his study with
scholarly circumspection and scientific caution. The philosophical and ethical aspects
of the inquiry are admittedly for the author and for the present reviewer beyond
question. As to the existence, scope, and exercise of such a right in juridical guarantees, the answer is more conditioned and variable than unreflecting and uninformed
thought would at first suppose. The sixth amendment of the Federal Constitution
guarantees the right of counsel in criminal prosecutions. But it was not until 1938
that the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst' interpreted the constitutional provision to extend to all criminal proceedings before the federal courts excepting such instances
where the accused has manifested competent waiver of counsel. The fortunes of the
right to counsel intrinsic to the concept of a fair trial have not however fared so
propitiously in state proceedings. In Powell v. Alabama,2 the Supreme Court almost
but fell short of raising the state civil right to the federal level. The Court has seen
in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment the requirement that in all
capital cases there be an offer of counsel and that a denial of it by the state exposes
the adjudication to reversal for its omission of one of the most significant indices
of a fair trial. Dr. Beaney proposes that until such time as the Supreme Court incorporates the right to counsel into the fourteenth amendment that the states themselves might by judicial construction or by statutory law equalize this right of state
constitutions with the interpretation given to the sixth amendment of the Federal
Constitution. Dr. Beaney enlarges upon the grave situation which confronts the
accused whose penury places him in greater disadvantages before the bench and he
strongly urges that the method of providing counsel (at present within the discretion
of the trial judge) be improved to remedy these disabilities. He recommends that
there be a more extensive resort to public defenders and state-aid agencies. The concluding appraisal of the author is that the right to counsel in criminal cases is not
enjoyed as consistently and widely in the United States as the needs of justice require
and much of this blame rests on the inadequate and indefinite legal guarantees of a
right fundamental to the concept of a fair trial.
Some sort of inventory must be made here of the contents of the book in order
to indicate schematically at least, the uncompromising thoroughness with which Dr.
Beaney devoted his learning and methodology to bear upon this civil right which
strangely indeed has received less studied attention from scholars than the other civil
rights and upon which the other constitutional rights depend so vitally.
After the introductory chapter, the author surveys the history of the right to
counsel in English and early American law. Chapter III examines the interpretative
construction put by the federal courts on the sixth amendment. Chapter IV makes
a similar study of the state constitutional provisions for the right to counsel and the
meaning given it by the state courts. Chapter V, "Right to Counsel, Due Process,
and the Federal Courts," appraises the federal review by the instrumentality of the
1. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
2. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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fourteenth amendment of the state criminal procedure. The last chapter, "The
Right to Counsel in Practice," analyzes the more important phases of the practical
problem complicated by generalities of provision, uncertainties of conditions, indefiniteness of methods of appointment and of the manner of establishing competent waiver,
and of the presumption in favor of the discretionary exercise of judgment of the trial
judge. The author's deep appreciation of the disabilities peculiar to the accused
indigent who cannot provide his own counsel finds expression in suggestions for
remedies. Precisely five hundred and seventy cases adjudicated by the Supreme,
federal, and state courts are brought to bear upon the problem. Reliance is placed
upon court records, briefs of counsel, personal attendance at a number of proceedings,
personal interviews of judges, lawyers and prosecutors, and an intimate kmowledge
of numerous law review articles on the subject; the author has not spared himself to
the grateful satisfaction of his readers. The format of the presentation is refreshingly
clear. Each chapter marks off the progression of the study by titles and subtitles
and the argumentum of the chapter is summarized in a conclusion which purses the
topical study into a balanced perspective and sharpens the issue into focus. The
pages are adequately footnoted. A Select Bibliography of books, documents and
articles, Table of Cases, and an Index are handsomely printed and further graced
by two Appendices of table charts which map out the "State Constitutional Provisions Regarding Counsel" and the "Duties of State Courts Under Statutory Provisions
Regarding Counsel." The University of Michigan Press should be commended for a
splendid publication of a valuable volume. The author does not hurry the reader
along but leads him with a sure footed step through a maze of variables. His style
of writing is a facile instrument of his thought. Perhaps Dr. Beaney may now prepare
for us a companion study of the practice of the use of counsel in non-juridical, administrative and political proceedings.
The objective which Dr. Beaney set for himself was the examination of the meaning and scope of the right to counsel in federal and state courts according to the
variant laws pertinent to each. His approach is historical and legal, legislative and
judicial The further back we move in the history of Anglo-American law it was in
the lesser rather than in the more serious violations of law that the government
inclined to sanction assistance for the defendant. Excepting treason cases for which
counsel was allowed, and, at the end of the seventeenth century, provision made for
the indigent defendant, right to counsel in English felony cases was nonexistent prior
to a statute of 1836 which permitted full representation by retained counsel. Amongst
the Colonists, defense by retained counsel was allowed in all criminal cases and in
early states history, appointment of counsel in capital cases was generally provided
for by statute. More likely than not the sixth amendment of the Federal Constitution was intended to guarantee the right to retain counsel since the provision for the
appointment of counsel in federal capital cases v.as stipulated in the Congressional
Act of 1790. In American constitutional history, three cases loom as central to the
perplexing involvements of the problem as it has endured to this day. In 193S the
Supreme Court ruled in Johnson -. Zerbst that failure to appoint counsel constituted
a jurisdictional defect which accordingly voided the conviction. Defendant in a federal
criminal proceeding may not be tried without counsel unless competent waiver of
counsel is manifest. In accordance with this decision, Rule 44 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure stipulated that defendants be advised of their right to retain
counsel and in instances of indigence the courts should offer to appoint counsel. In
state proceedings, however, the situation has not been very much clarified. There
is neither uniform provision in state constitutions for the appointment of counsel nor,
where such provision is made, does it depend on identical conditions nor extend to
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similar cases. Further, the problem is plunged into greater complexity since there
is no explicit uniform method of establishing a genuine waiver of counsel. In the
endeavor to level off federal-state practices, the Court had held in Powell v. Alabama
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment operated as a limitation
upon state policy concerning counsel in criminal proceedings. Justice Sutherland,
speaking for the Court, maintained that due process had been denied because of
failure of effective appointment of counsel in a capital case where the defendants were
illiterate, youthful, and strangers to the community. The logical development of this
Court ruling might have extended to cover all criminal proceedings save for the
alternate ruling in Betts v. Brady.3 The denial by the Maryland trial court to appoint
counsel for the indigent defendant in a non-capital case was deemed by the Court not
to be violative of due process since the trial had been conducted fairly. The injection
of a fair trial rule robbed the reasoning of Sutherland, given in the earlier Powell
case, of unconditioned application, and now subjected the right to counsel to many
variables and assumptions which diminish the possibility of a clear-cut rule for
capital cases and for non-capital cases. Four of the justices, Douglas, Murphy, Black,
and Rutledge, endeavored to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights, including the sixth
amendment, into the fourteenth. But they could not prevail against the fair trial
rule of the Betts case except by expanding that to include in the circumstances of
each case singly before the court the appointment of counsel as an element constitutive of fair trial.
In the event that the states do not establish better legal guarantees and more
reliable methods for providing counsel, the author does not see much hope for the
reduction of the large number of cases up for review by the Supreme Court save by
a broader construction of the fourteenth amendment as formerly espoused by the
four "incorporators," or by making the fair trial rule inclusive of the assistance of
counsel.
"The alternate seems obvious. The Supreme Court, either by declaring that under
modern conditions due process in criminal proceedings requires counsel, unless waived,
or by formulating a new application of its fair-trial doctrine, should take the firm
position that a trial cannot be fair unless counsel assists every defendant who wants
or needs the aid of counsel." (p. 235).
JOSEPH F. CosTANzo, S.J.f
By J. Garner Anthony. Stanford University Press,
Stanford, California: 1955. Pp. 204.

HAwAI UNDER ARMY RuLE.

Although it is a matter of common knowledge that the preservation of human rights
is more difficult under the stress of war, few Americans realize the speed with which
cherished constitutional safeguards may be lost. The American, who constantly boasts
that his is a government of laws and not of men, is justifiably proud of his English
legal heritage when he refers to the writ of habeas corpus. Mr. Justice Story, writing
of the writ of habeas corpus, said that it is, ".... justly esteemed the great bulwark of
personal liberty; since it is the appropriate remedy to ascertain whether any person
is rightfully in confinement or not, and the cause of his confinement; and if no sufficient ground of detention appears, the party is entitled to his immediate discharge."'
3. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
t Professor of Political Science, Fordham University Graduate School.
1. 2 Story, Constitution § 1339 (1851).
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Hence, in times of crisis, subversion, and international tension, any discussion of
martial law, with its consequent suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, assumes
particular importance. It is with this in mind that the American should undertake
to read Hawaii Under Army Rule.
The book is a case history of martial law in Hawaii during World War II. It relates
chronologically, and with a reasonable degree of restraint, all of the key facts commencing on December 7, 1941 through February 25, 1946, at which time the Supreme
Court in Duncan v. KahanamokuP held military trials of civilians in Hawaii to be

illegal.
The story told in this short, interesting, and well-written book begins to unfold at
11:30 A.M. on December 7, 1941, only a few hours after the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor. It was at that time that Joseph B. Poinde.xter, Governor of Hawaii,
issued a proclamation invoking the powers conferred upon him under the Hawaiian
Defense Act. At 3:30 of that fateful day, he issued a proclamation placing the
Territory under martial law and suspended the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act.3 In the opinion of the author, Governor
Poindexter's proclamation went beyond the provisions of section 67 of the Hawaiian
Organic Act insofar as it not only suspended the writ of habeas corpus and proclaimed
martial law, but also proclaimed:
".. . and I do hereby authorize and request the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, during the present emergency and until the danger of invasion is removed, to exercise all of the powers normally exercised by me as governor; and I
do further authorize and request the said Commanding General... during the present
emergency and until the danger of invasion is removed to exercise the powers normally
exercised by judicial officers and employees of this territory.... ." (p. 5).
Simultaneously with the issuance of the Governor's proclamation, Lt Gen. Walter C.
Short issued a proclamation in which he announced to the people of Hawaii that he
assumed the position of "Military Governor of Hawaii" and had "taken charge of the
Government of the Territory." Part of the General's proclamation was in the nature
of a promise which, according to the author, was probably generously fulfiled. It
provided:
"I shall . . . shortly publish ordinances governing the conduct of the people of the
Territory with respect to the showing of lights, circulation, meetings, censorship,
possession of arms, ammunition, and explosives, and the sale of intoxicating liquors
and other subjects.
"In order to assist in repelling the threatened invasion of our island home, good
citizens will cheerfully obey this proclamation and the ordinances to be published;
others will be required to do so. Offenders will be severely punished by military
tribunals or will be held in custody until such time as the civil courts are able to
function." (p. 6).
The author states that the text of the Governor's proclamation was never comcunicated to President Roosevelt, but rather, the Governor sent to the President a
terse telegram in which he informed the President that he had declared martial law
and had suspended the writ of habeas corpus. President Roosevelt ackmowledged
receipt of the Governor's telegram and approved the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. Mr. Anthony consequently emphasizes that neither the Governor's proclamation, purporting to turn over the powers of his office and the powers of the judicial
officers of the Territory to the Commanding General, nor the Proclamation of the
2.
3.

327 U.S. 304 (1946).
43 U.S.C.A. § 532.
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Commanding General, in which the General assumed the role of Military Governor,
were ever submitted to the President for his approval. (p. 6).
Concerning the responsibility for the initiation of martial law in Hawaii, the author
asserts that "it is clear that martial law was initiated by the army and that both
Governor Poindexter and General Short thought that it would be of short duration
unless the raid proved to be a prelude to a land invasion." (p. 6). He is, therefore,
in sharp disagreement with Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr. and Secretary of
War Robert P. Patterson who have declared that martial law was declared by the
civilian Governor who turned over his powers to the military commander. The
author declares that neither Secretary Patterson nor General Richardson had any
knowledge of the facts surrounding the initiation of martial law and quotes Governor
Poindexter who states that it was General Short who called at his office and requested
that the Governor declare martial law and suspend the writ of habeas corpus. At
that conference, preceding the declaration, the Governor asked the General how long
martial law would continue. The General replied that ".

.

. he was unable to say, but

if it developed that this was a raid only and not a prelude to a landing, martial law
could be lifted within a reasonably short time." (p. 8). It is clearly the position of
Mr. Anthony that it was the Army that initiated martial law in Hawaii and he
states that the contrary is a "myth,"
ment ... ." (p. 9).

"...

carefully nurtured by the War Depart-

After a discussion' of the facts surrounding the declaration of martial law, the
author recounts a first-hand story of what actually happened in Hawaii. By order of
the Military Governor all courts were thereafter closed, ".

.

. army personnel moved

in," (p. 10) and thus began a regime of government under "military orders." Specific
reference is made to many of these orders and the author demonstrates that they
cover the entire sweep of government with the sole exception of taxation. As the
author views the situation, whenever any civilian problem arose, the quick answer
was another military order. In the opinion of the author, the orders themselves were
ineptly and carelessly drawn by people who were apparently serving an apprenticeship
in the art of draftsmanship in the office of the Military Governor. (pp. 13, 15).
The book reminds the reader that there was nothing ".

.

. resembling disloyalty, dis-

order or misconduct on the part of the civil population which justified the proclamation of martial law on December 7, 1941 or its continuance in the days that followed
the attack." (p. 19). The caustic criticism of the Army may lead the reader to believe
that the author is anti-military and wishes to injure the dignity and good name of
the Army. Although in all fairness such is not the case; it is written by an attorney
who served as Attorney General of Hawaii from October, 1942 through December, 1943.
In five terse chapters Mr. Anthony traces the declaration of martial law, the organization of the military government and its vast operations, the military government
and the courts and the termination of martial law. Apart from the accurate statement
of the several cases that arose to test the legality of martial law, the book tells the
reader about incidents that traditionally are out of place in legal decisions. Hence,
the reader may not otherwise know of them. For example, a shocking incident is recounted concerning a deputy marshal who, while attempting to serve papers upon
General Richardson, was assaulted by the Military Police who prevented the service.
The author observes that the ".

.

. spectacle of a commanding general of the United

States Army evading the process of a middle-aged deputy United States marshal as
though he were a fugitive from justice did not add to the prestige of the Army."
(p. 68).

The writ of habeas corpus was not used in Hawaii until July 30, 1943. In the
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chapter on "Military Government in the Courts" the author relates the hassle between
Judge Delbert E. Metzger and General Richardson whereby the court prepared a
citation of contempt against the General and the General retaliated by a military order
prohibiting all pending and future habeas corpus proceedings in Hawaii and providing
penalties for the infraction of the order.
In this small book there is much that is worthy of thought. The author points out
that a military government is "... essentially like any other form of bureaucracy. Its
tendency is to expand not liquidate." (p. 98). In a terse concluding chapter the
author states that the conflict he described between the military and civil authorities
illustrates the validity of the caveat that, "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."
Although the author admits that it is perhaps natural that in time of war the general
populace will look to the military for leadership and direction, he warns that "there
is danger in overlooking the necessity of keeping the military subordinate to the civil
power." (p. 121). He quotes the words of Clemenceau that "war is too serious a
business to be left to the generals." (p. 121).
The author's concluding thought may justify repetition:
"Despite the profound mistrust of military rule which we have inherited and which
dates back to the founding of the nation, in the wake of the recent war there seems
to be abroad a notion that because one has excelled in the arts of war he therefore
will excel in the arts of peace or in the arts of government. Hence we find posts in
our government which require the highest qualities of statesmanship filled by persons
whose chief recommendation for elevation is their proficiency in military affairs. This
tendency, if unchecked, may work a gradual but radical change in our form of government." (pp. 122-23).
Perhaps many readers will not agree with some of the opinions and inferences drawn
by the author even if they were to agree with the facts that be relates. Nevertheless,
no one can close the pages of this book, with its thorough documentation, without
having had cause to reevaluate this important chapter of American history.
EDwARO D. Rnjf
TmE DEVELOPMENT or ACADEmC FREEnom LN THE U.-rED STATES.

By Richard

Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger. Columbia University Press, New York: 19S5.
Pp. 527;
ACADE

c FREEDOM ix Ou Trnm. By Robert M. MlacIver. Columbia University

Press, New York: 1955. Pp. 329;
CoLLEcTIVIsrm ON THE CAmpUS:THE BATTLE FOR THE MND IN AMERICAT COLLEGES.
By E. Merrill Root. Devin-Adair, New York: 1955. Pp. 403.
Academic freedom, a very old concept and reality, is neither democratic nor undemocratic, in essence, despite the cant nowadays about the aim of the Academy
being to "teach democracy," and all the confused identification of prescriptive
freedoms with doctrinaire egalitarianism. These three books, though differing about
much, all rise superior to the notion that academic freedom is somehow a product of
"democracy" and ought to be employed simply to advance "democracy." Professors
Hofstadter and Metzger's thick book is dispassionate, by and large; Professor MacIver's, rather belligerently liberal; Professor Root's, passionately "radical conservative." All three are serious studies, containing passages of some wisdom. But their
philosophical postulates are in conflict.
- Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
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Perhaps, before examining these books, I ought to make clear my own view of the
essence of academic freedom, about which I have written a good deal at one time or
another, especially in my book by that title, an essay in definition. Academic freedom
-I think that these four authors and the present reviewer agree in this--is a body
of rights possessed by those scholars and teachers in an institution of higher learning;
and those rights exist to protect the members of the Academy from the hazards
incident to the conservation and pursuit of Truth. Academic freedom existed, and
continues to exist, in societies quite unlike our American society, and in societies
markedly undemocratic. Democracy, properly defined, is not a moral ideal: rather, it
is a political description, although a vague one, of a certain political condition of a
certain particular society. As Dr. Eric Voegelin says, "Theory is true, not 'democratic.' " Although the survival of academic freedom is important for the future of
American democracy, it is still more important for the future of Truth. We ought
not, therefore, to attempt to bind academic freedom to some particular ideology or
social condition. Academic freedom is not, per se, "democratic," or "monarchical," or
"feudalistic," or "oligarchical," or "aristocratic." As Tocqueville wrote, there commonly is a higher degree of freedom of opinion and expression in aristocracies than
in democracies; he knew of no country in which opinion was so restricted as in democratic America-though restricted by an impalpable conformity to popular shibboleths,
rather than by positive laws. All academic freedom is genuinely undemocratic in
one sense, that the Academy is a kind of intellectual aristocracy within which ideas
unpopular with the crowd still may be investigated and expressed. The end of the
Academy is to elevate the private reason, independent of particular ideologies.
Now academic freedom is in some danger among us; and that danger, in part,
results from the fact that we live in a democratic society. Doctrinaire egalitarianism
is hostile toward all special privileges and bodies of immunities: academic freedom
is such a complex of privileges and immunities. Some of the levelers who dislike
academic freedom are outside the walls of the Academy; others are inside those walls;
and certain people who give ardent lip-service to academic freedom really have no
respect for that body of liberties. The present controversy over academic freedom
seems to have been brought on by a conflict of the views of certain academicians
with the established views of American society. And no amount of expostulation
will resolve this conflict; we need to resort to first principles. These three books
help to remind us what those first principles of academic freedom are.
Every right, as Professor MacIver reminds us, is married to some duty. Academic
freedom has its responsibilities. To assert an abstract academic freedom, unqualified
and irresponsible, is to expose the rights of the Academy to that destruction which
always follows hard upon the doctrinaire assertion of the Jacobin theory of rights.
It is no use for partisans of the Academy to pretend that the Academy owes no
responsibility to any authority, divine or human; nor is anything to be gained by
repeating, like an incantation, that the whole aim of the Academy is to "serve the
people." The Academy has duties toward society; and if it neglects those duties, it
must lose its privileges and immunities; but it is not simply a servile instrument of
an abstract People. It is one of the responsibilites of the Academy to preserve the
established moral and social values of the civilization in which the Academy has its
being. In America, the Academy has the duty of respecting, and maintaining, our
principles of republican government, liberty under law, equality before the law, and
private rights. The Academy, I think, has no right to be a nest of subversives. But
academic freedom is more than a perpetual exercise in political debate. True freedom
of the mind does not abide any test of conformity to ideology. The best things in
human existence are above politics. The Academy is not simply a classroom for
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democracy, or for any other especial form of politics. To reduce the Academy to that
level would be to place its freedom in frequent jeopardy.
Yet though the theory of academic freedom prescribes no especial form of politics,
still it enjoins a decent respect for the rights of the society in which the Academy
exists. The Academy ought not to tolerate within its walls any body of persons
who do not hold, or at least tolerate, that decent respect. The Communists do not
hold that decent respect. It is my thesis, then, that the Communists have no right
to the liberties of the Academy. If we endure their presence there at all, it is
because we feel that they constitute no present danger to the Academy or to society,
or else that the profession of Communism by some particular academician is merely
a private vagary, little influencing his work within the Academy. I do not mean that
the rising generation ought to be kept ignorant of Marxism, or of any other body
of political notions; in our age, ignorance is a weak bulwark against error. It does
not follow, however, that merely offering instruction in Marxism will expose the errors
of Marxism, any more than general discussion of Naziism and Communism in Germany saved the Germans from those ideologies. Our established system of education
offers courses in good literary composition, but it does not offer courses in bad
literary composition. Because we inculcate marital fidelity, we do not feel impelled
to appoint an adulterer to a professorship of adultery, in the theory that the truth
will prevail in a full and frank democratic discussion. Because we teach Christian
brotherhood, we are not obliged to appoint a Jew-baiter to teach racial hatred, so
as to be "fair to both sides."
The Academy, if it is to enjoy any rights, must acknowledge some principles of
truth, and not constitute itself as a mere sophistical debating society, doubting everything, sneering at all things prescriptive. Marxism is false; every man who studies
history with any degree of impartiality, or who acknowledges the classical and
Christian principles of justice, now knows this. The Academy sins if the Academy
places falsehood on the same platform with truth. And when the college or university
offers instruction in a subject, it implies that there is some truth in that subject. If
the rising generation already could perceive every difference between truth and falsehood, it would not need to enter the Academy at all. By treating Communisn as
entitled to have its say, the Academy would give Communism some implicit sanction.
I repeat that we ought not to keep the rising generation ignorant of Marxism; I think,
on the contrary, that the study of Marxism is an important part of any thorough
course of study in politics; but such studies ought not to be supervised by doctrinaire
Marxists, or offered as "one point of view"--presumably as good as any other point
of view. The clever Communist, moreover, ordinarily does not teach "Marxism. 1012'
He may teach literature, or physics, or history. He does not present his case frankly;
his methods are insinuation, subtle indoctrination, and organization of Communist
cells among students. He is not a naive heretic, but, as Professor Sidney Hook says,
a conspirator. Of all people, the Communist is least interested in frank discussion,
or in the liberties of the Academy.
These are my views on the aspect of academic freedom most heatedly discussed just
at present; and I offer them for what they are worth, and acknowledge my criticism
of these three recent books to be undertaken in this light. I maintain, in short,
that we are not obliged to tolerate, in the Academy or out of it, those who would
not tolerate us if they had power; nor are we obliged to tolerate those who would
subvert the civil social order under the cloak of freedom of study and teaching.
Academic freedom, like the Bill of Rights, is not a suicide pact.
The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States is a well-written and
valuable volume. No study of this thoroughness has been published before. Like
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Mr. MacIver's book, this work was made possible by a grant from the Louis M.
Rabinowicz Foundation, and is published under the auspices of the American Academic
Freedom Project at Columbia University, after more than four years of research.
An executive committee and panel of advisers, consisting for the greater part of
eminent liberals (among them Mr. Henry Steele Commager, Miss Sarah G. Blanding,
Mr. Frank P. Graham, Mrs. Eugene Meyer, Mr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Dean
Erwin N. Griswold) had general supervision of the Project. It is the more satisfying, then, that despite some suggestion of "anti-anti-communist" tone among the committeemen and advisors, Messrs. Hofstadter and Metzger's volume is really what
it declares itself to be, "an analytical history," moderate in judgments and generally
the product of what Burke called, approvingly, "a liberal understanding." It is divided
into two parts: "The Age of the College," by Mr. Hofstadter, and "The Age of the
University," by Mr. Metzger. The dividing-line is the period between 1865 and 1890,
when the true university began to arise in America.
Being substantially pragmatists, the two authors are not much interested in
the philosophical basis of academic freedom. Their accounts of the historical development of such rights, however, are thorough and tolerant. Mr. Hofstadter's description of medieval universities is interesting and even sympathetic; its tone may be
suggested by this penetrating sentence: "In the Middle Ages tradition was, if Taylor
is right, particularly formidable; but to say that it suppressed originality and destroyed
the power of the scholastics to produce novelty would be to fly in the face of the
intellectual resourcefulness of academic men during the twelfth, thirteenth, and
fourteenth centuries." (p. 12). Again, "the medieval universities were ecclesiastical
agencies founded at a time when the Church was still effectually guarding its institutions from the incursions of lay power. Both the church principle of ecclesiastical
independence and the guild principle of corporate self-government provided the universities and society at large with dominant models of autonomy." (p. 12). It must
be said, however, that despite honest attempts at impartiality, Mr. Hofstadter sometimes slips into the habit of using "conservatism," "orthodoxy," and "clerical interests"
as devil-terms. Yet he understands and approves such conservative educators as
Henry Philip Tappan, at the University of Michigan, and Francis Bowen, at Harvard.
All in all, Professor Hofstadter's work is a model of scholarly writing.
Mr. Metzger's section is similarly perceptive and good tempered. His sympathies,
it is true, are with the innovator and the liberal, but he recognizes the values of
tradition, as in this interesting distinction between freedom in the colleges and freedom
for the colleges:
"The shift from conserving to searching portended great changes in the conception
of academic freedom. As long as conserving was the foremost ideal, academic freedom
was a freedom for, not in, the colleges. The conserver, taken as an ideal-type within
the ranks of the men of knowledge, regards the knowledge inherited from the past as
the seasoned wisdom of the race or the afflatus of God. As priest, he celebrates it;
as scholastic, he systematizes it; as fundamentalist, he applies it, reverencing ipsissima
verba. The pre-Civil War academic, by filling all three roles, maintained a certain
intellectual autonomy-a freedom and isolation as a member of the community of the
educated. In a New World, peopled by the uprooted, he kept alive a respect for traditions. In a democratic society, tending to be plebiscitarian in taste as well as in
politics, he resisted the attempts of public whim and vulgarity to depreciate the
college education. A good part of his opposition to a more secular university and a
more vocationalized curriculum stemmed from his desire to protect very fragile values
from the crush of a rough society. He sought the freedom not to acquiesce in the
philistinism of his age." (p. 317).
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Mr. Metzger traces with care the course of our universities through 'arwinism

and

the New Regime," "The German Influence," and "Academic Freedom and Big Business." He criticizes understandingly the 1915 Report of the Committee on Academic
Freedom and Tenure of the AAUP. By no means what Professor Hook calls a
"ritualistic liberal," Professor Metzger is severe upon the somewhat inconsistent
attitude of the AAUP Committee on Academic Freedom in Wartime, in 1918: "The
unnerved professors of the Committee bear witness that not all the casualties of wvar
are to be found upon the battlefield." (p. 504). He ends upon a note of confidence,
though alarmed at the slender thread upon which our academic freedom hangs.
When we turn to Academic Freedom in Our Time, we enter into the heated atmosphere of current controversy; and Professor MacIver often adds to the heat, without
casting proportionate light. It is rather saddening to find him quoting, as if he needed
reassurance, gentlemen much his inferiors in judgment and scholarship, like Professor
Henry Steele Commager and Dr. Harold Taylor. For Dr. MacIver is a highly distinguished political scientist, and when he sticks to his last, this is an informative book.
He lucidly implies, for instance, that academic freedom is a natural right, or body of
rights-that is, rights growing out of the nature of the function performed: "This
freedom is not to be thought of as a privilege, not as a concession, nor as something
that any authority inside or outside the institution may properly grant or deny, qualify
or regulate, according to its interest or its discretion. It is something instead that is
inherently bound up with the performance of the university's task, something as
necessary for that performance as pen and paper, as class-rooms and students, as
laboratories and libraries." (p. 11). I endeavor to make precisely this point in my
own Academic Freedom, but Mr. MacIver makes it better.
And Professor MacIver is very good on the ends of higher education, especially in
his demolition of the devotees of pragmatic research. He says of the 1948 Report of
the President's Commission on Higher Education, "here we have the spectacle of
a body, itself largely composed of educators, entrusted with an educational survey of
national importance, recommending for the advancement of higher education that its
vital principle, the cultivation of the mind, be still further diminished to make way
for other things." (p. 277). He has no patience with cant in the discussion of higher
education, nor in the discussion of democracy:
"If every man is as good as his fellow, the scholar is entitled to no more respect, even
in his own field, than his untutored neighbor.... Since the many never rule, and
since any form of government-monarchy, dictatorship, or any sort of oligarchymay be in accord with the will of the majority, and even of their suffrage, democracy
cannot be identified along this line. The distinctive feature of democracy is not the rule
of the majority but the fundamental rights it assures to the minority." (pp. 249-50).
Yet despite this prescience and this candor, Dr. MacIver's book is vitiated by two
serious deficiences: first, a scarcely concealed hostility toward the theological assumptions in which all freedoms have their sanction; second, a really surprising indifference toward the threat which Communism presents to academic freedom.
If pragmatism seems to be a strong influence upon the minds of Mr.Hofstadter
and Mr. Metzger, the premises which govern Mr. MacIver's thought are those of an
old-fangled rationalism, dominant in the Scottish universities which he knew in his
youth and pervasive in Mr. MacIver's books ever since. Although endeavoring, in
the interest of impartiality, to leave some place in the Academy for the man of
religious convictions, nevertheless Dr. MacIver cannot help making it clear that he
thinks theology or anything of that sort, really unworthy of a university. So far as
academic freedom is concerned, he writes, "the word truth can be relevant only to
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knowledge that depends on investigation, that can always be questioned and retested,
and that is never accepted on the ground that it is the deliverance of any authority,
human or divine." (p. 4). He implies that "denominational colleges" really do not fit
into the theory of academic freedom at all, relegating them to an appendix. "To
the scholar who is under theological discipline," he says, "one possible conclusion from
the facts is ruled out in advance while to the scholar not so obligated it remains open."
(p. 286). (Dr. MacIver's italics.) (Here he is using as an example the population
problem in Puerto Rico, to suggest the dismaying irrationality of Catholics, apparently; he does not mention Ireland.) On the next page he recants, in part, and
confesses that ". . . those who are loyal believers in a theology [do not] feel any less
free in their own search for knowledge than those who do not accept it." (p. 287). But
the implication remains that they are fools, nevertheless. That freedom is submission to the will of God; that the search for truth may be all the more hopeful
because a scholar does not disregard or leave in doubt the first principles of human
nature-these considerations have no place in Dr. MacIver's analysis of academic
freedom.
Since Dr. MacIver feels a hostility toward authority, tradition, and theology as
queen of the sciences, it follows that he depreciates the Academy as an institution
for conserving the wisdom of our ancestors, and emphasizes its role as the agency
of innovation and experiment. "The modem university is not understood as merely
or even mainly the purveyor of accepted knowledge. One of its greatest functions
is to prevent doctrine from becoming dogma and truth, however understood, from
degenerating into prejudice." (p. 258). For Dr. MacIver, all questions are forever
open, and the dogma of Progress is the only dogma he professes. As with his remarks
on theology, so with his remarks on accepted knowledge: he recants, in part, on his
next page. He does acknowledge the existence of "permanent realities." Yet one
gathers, from the general tenor of his remarks, that he believes we are living in an
age subject, if not to totem and taboo, at least to the dead hand of custom and
received opinion. In this, as in much else, Dr. MacIver seems to dwell in the nineteenth century, and exhibits no consciousness that the great danger, nowadays, is the
dissolution of belief in any abiding realities; and that in the middle of the twentieth
century it is the role of the university as conservator, rather than as innovator, which
requires emphasis. We are not in any peril of stagnation; but we see all about us
the consequences of the assumption that we were born yesterday.
This rather rigid nineteenth-century rationalism of Professor MacIver's directly
affects his judgments on the present controversy over Communism in the Academy.
Professor Sidney Hook recently tore Mr. MacIver limb from limb on this score, in
the pages of the New York Times Book Review; so I shall only suggest here the
curious myopia of Dr. MacIver when he looks at our present political spectrum on
the campus. "It happens that in this country, so far as the universities are concerned,"
Dr. MacIver writes, "the organized attack [on academic freedom] comes almost
entirely from certain right-wing groups, just as in some other countries it may now
come more often from the left." (p. 124). These right-wing groups that Dr. MacIver
has in mind are interestingly disparate: he brackets the name of Mr. Allen Zoll with
that of the distinguished economist Professor Ludwig von Mises, and confounds the
ideas of Mr. Max Eastman with those of Mr. William Buckley Jr., and flogs various
dead horses, including the EducationalReviewer, a magazine which ceased publication
more than two years ago. His performance is the more surprising because he also
writes that "conservatism is at least as congenial to scholarship as is liberalism-so
far as the two are not really one." (p. 260).
And here is a truly astounding generalization of Mr. MacIver's: "There is no
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scintilla of evidence that the policies or programs of any of our institutions of higher
learning have been influenced or are in danger of being influenced by communist
educators." (p. 260). No scintilla of evidence? Where has Professor MlacIver been
these past ten years? Has he never looked into the books of Mr. Hook, or 'Mr.
Burnham, or Mr. Hicks? Has he never glanced at the names of professors subscribed
to Communist and Communist-front petitions? One would think that he had succeeded in insulating himself absolutely against the climate of opinion that prevailed
on a good many campuses during the 'thirties and 'forties, and which lingers at more
than a few colleges. It is pleasant to think that Mr. MacIver has been untroubled by
any awareness of this disagreeable business; but I believe that a gentleman so unwilling to face facts is an unsure guide to academic freedom in our time. This baneful
influence is waning among us now, I am convinced; and often it was exerted more
directly by naive fellow-travellers than by Communist Party members; but to claim
that such influence never existed is to fly in the face of Mr. MacIver's own rationality,
let alone Providence. Deny a fact, and that fact will be your master. If there were
space, I could cite several cases, from my private knowledge, of cliques very like
Communist cells still at work-and that not ineffectually-on college campuses. I
think that the great tendency of ideas and interests in our time will undo these cliques,
presently, without the need of formal repression; but that does not mean we can
afford to ignore their activity, or to affirm that they simply do not exist.
Despite the hundreds of cases of alleged violations of academic freedom brought
to the attention of the Association of University Professors in recent years, Mr. MacIver's book contains little evidence that positive injustice has often been done to
persons of radical or liberal views. Dr. MacIver himself, indeed, often seems to be
more greatly concerned with activities that lie upon the periphery of academic freedom
than with the heart of the matter. He worries about the policies of the overseas
libraries of the United States Information Service, which have very little to do with
the Academy; he presents as one exhibit of what has been called "the climate of fear"
the case of ". . . a professor of classics who received a Fulbright award to study in
Italy but had it cancelled by the State Department because his wife had resorted to
the Fifth Amendment." (p. 266). I doubt whether the boundaries of academic freedom
can be extended to guarantee a Fulbright award to anyone who wants it; but if
Professor MacIver is interested in Fulbright policies, he might investigate the great
difficulties which conservatives, or conservative liberals, confront when they apply
for such grants. An American professor as distinguished in the field of economics as
Dr. MacIver is in political science informs me that a Republican might as well not
bother to apply for a Fulbright-and that even under the present Republican administration. One of the questions asked concerning applicants for Fulbright grants is this:
"Is the applicant a representative American?" A representative American, there is
reason to believe, means to many of the people in charge of Fulbright appointments
a scholar who subscribes to the line, say, of the New Republic. We certainly suffer
from intolerance nowadays; but not all of it-and, I think, not the larger share-comes from Dr. M1acIver's "right-wing groups." It is not right-wing groups vwho
dominate our educationist bureaucracy or our great foundations.
Another odd excursion of Dr. MacIver's is his denunciation of the Educational
Reviewer, a little monthly magazine now defunct, which was devoted to reviewing
textbooks from a conservative point of view. Whatever opinion one may have had
of this journal-and, unless it was unlike all other magazines, some of its reviews vere
good and some were not--simply to publish such a magazine is not to violate anyone's academic freedom. A man who writes a book, even a textbook, sets himself up
for a mark to be shot at; such is the nature of things. The professor's right to
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academic freedom does not include an exemption from any hostile criticism of his
published works. Liberal or even radical textbooks receive approving reviews in a good
many quarters. I find it difficult to understand how Professor MacIver, upon his own
liberal principles, can grow furious over the mere existence of controversy. That the
Educational Reviewer often urged state educational authorities, school boards, and
professors not to adopt certain textbooks is not in itself sinister: choices among
books must be made, and the supporters of the Educational Reviewer had as much
right to express their preferences, whether sound or unsound in Mr. MacIver's eyes
or my eyes, as had anyone else. We Happy Few have no just claim to a monopoly of
reviewing and judgment, and only if a professor's book were suppressed by conspiratorial means would academic freedom be violated. Mr. MacIver quotes from
what appears to have been a silly review of a book on economici But I might quote
from reviews still sillier in learned journals-take the treatment in certain quarters,
for instance, of a work of profound scholarship by a professor of conservative inclinations, Dr. Eric Voegelin's New Science of Politics. We have to tolerate a great deal
of silliness in book reviewing for the sake of getting books read at all. Such reviews
deserve reprobation, as Dr. MacIver says; but they violate no one's academic freedom.
Endeavoring to refute the charge that American professors and teachers are radicals,
Dr. MacIver contends that they are more conservative than the mass of the population. I think he is right, though his evidence is scanty. The teacher, after all, is by
occupation a conservator of received opinion. Yet it is in the nature of the conservative, as F. J. C. Hearnshaw suggested, simply to sit and think, or perhaps merely
to sit; and a Jacobin minority within any body of professors or teachers, by persistent
agitation and intrigue, may come to dominate the community of scholars and to control-or at least to exert a veto upon-the policies of universities and colleges. This
is the theme of Professor Root's book.
Dr. E. Merrill Root is a poet, and his book is a poet's book-though his prose style
is not equal to his poetic style. Collectivism on the Campus is a world away from
the two books of the American Academic Freedom Project: passionate, sometimes
ingenuous, and infused with religious conviction. He is convinced that radicals and
collectivistic liberals exert an influence upon our campuses out of all proportion to
their numbers, and through the examination of a number of cases he supports his
thesis strongly. It is true, as Professor Sidney Hook remarks, that Mr. Root does
not prove any professor to have been discharged because of his conservative opinions:
some have been denied promotion, and others have been let go if they lacked tenure,
but an out-and-out case of discharge is not to be found here, unless it is that of Mr.
W. T. Couch at the University of Chicago-which incident, however, in my opinion,
had for its proximate cause the arrogance of certain administrators at the University,
even though political opinions seem to have been in the background. Yet the fact
that it is difficult to prove a professor was discharged because of conservative views
does not mean that no such discharge ever has occurred. No college president ever
would bluntly state that he had dismissed a professor because of that professor's conservatism: other formal pretexts would be found; they are rarely lacking. And a
professor who has been dismissed because of his conservatism, even more than a
professor who has been dismissed because of his radicalism, may find it expedient
to say as little as possible about his dismissal if he wants employment elsewhere,
the climate of opinion being what it is. The cases of discrimination against Dr.
Alexander St. Ivanyi, Dr. Kenneth C. Colegrove, Dr. Felix Wittmer, and others cited
by Mr. Root carry conviction. And his argument that many sincere educators exhibit
dismaying naivete when forced to make some judgment on the activities of the Left
is also put with some strength.
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For my part, I am inclined to think that the intolerance of Right and Left within
the Academy, as described by Mr. MacIver and Mr. Root, may now be diminishing
because of a general alteration of political opinion at work in America, inside and
outside the Academy. We may be becoming more intelligently conservative as a
people; certainly the God that Failed no longer inspires the rising generation of
scholars, though milder forms of collectivistic theory will have their vogue on campuses for a while yet. The ultra-conservative who suspected our colleges of being
nests of subversives will have less reason to wax wrathy; and the Communist cell
may shrink to the vanishing point, and the nervous and resentful "liberal" on the
campus may cease to denounce any conservative colleague as an agent of malign
reaction. I am inclined to think, in short, that although we will not be able to forget
about threats to academic freedom, those threats, increasingly, will come from another
quarter than directly political ideology.
The vociferous radical minority on our campuses will be fairly active for some years
yet, nevertheless; at present they are thriving on, rather than shrinking from, the
debate over "McCarthyism." When two near-Communists were forced to leave the
faculty of Reed College in 1954, for good and sufficient reasons, the president also was
compelled to resign, upon the protest of many members of the faculty against his
action. It still is advantageous, at many colleges, for a radical teacher to cloah his
incompetence or faults of character with the garments of the martyred reformer:
Henry Mulcahy, in The Groves of Academe, suggests the type. As Professor lacI'er
suggests, "the scholar is under obligation to show the same regard for evidence on
the platform that he does in the classroom and not to resort to cheap and prejudicial
methods of persuasion. . . . As was said by John Dewey, 'lack of reverence for

things that mean much to humanity, joined with a craving for public notoriety, may
induce a man to pose as a martyr to truth when in reality he is a victim of his own
lack of mental and moral poise." (p. 233).
An instance of this: at a Wisconsin college, a few months ago, the president suggested to the faculty that the college consider establishing a summer institute of
conservative studies, to examine the foundations of our civilization in the light of
present problems, and to bring together distinguished American and foreign thinkers
for a discussion of the conservation of our society. At once the unfortunate president
was assailed by a small clique of embittered radicals, who declared that nothing
"conservative".had any place in a liberal arts college. This clique sent reports of the
faculty discussion, which had been held confidential by the faculty itself, to radical
publications, and in other ways seriously embarrassed the president, who was new to
his post. The leaders in the clique were instructors without tenure, who-well before
the president's plan had been discussed, or even thought of-had been notified that
their services would not be required in the coming year, for adequate reasons unconnected with private political opinion. Thus they were enabled to pose as martyrs,
and perhaps to secure reappointment accordingly-or, at worst, to rouse a party in
their favor and possibly obtain posts at another college on the strength of their heroic
stand in favor of "liberalism." It was Professor Mulcahy all over again. The intemperance which afflicts our institutions of higher learning, I suggest, nowadays
comes principally from the virulent Left, not from "right-wing groups."
Yet I think that the debate over ideology will grow less intense, during the next
few years. The dispute probably will be transferred to the subject of lowered standards
in our colleges and universities, what with the "rising tide" of students, and the
consequently lowered status and degree of independence of the professor. The reality
of academic freedom is dependent upon two conditions: first, that the professors are
men of truly liberal understanding, dedicated to the preservation and the increase of
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truth; second, that the students are reasonably serious and earnest young people,
who actually want to be at a genuine institution of higher learning, and can benefit
from being there. If the professor becomes a mere dominie, overworked and reduced
to lecturing dully upon a mass of facts that the students should have acquired earlier;
if the student becomes a bored boy or girl who has come along for the ride and a
"snob degree," ignorant even of the rudiments of learning-why, then, the elevated
discussion which gives academic freedom its sanction can be carried on no longer,
and our institutions of higher learning will have become, in Dr. Robert M. Hutchins'
phrase, mere custodial institutions, staffed by adolescent-sitters. I do not exaggerate.
The educational imperialists are thrusting just this situation upon us. Dr. Milton
Eisenhower, for instance, looks forward gladly to the day when the students will
not have to see their professor, but will watch a television set, and the professor can
"serve" hundreds or thousands of students at once; and the honors system in examinations can be abolished, too, for monitors will train their television cameras on whole
rooms full of students. Just how much academic freedom there will be in such an
"educational" plant, I think I know.
Both Mr. MacIver and Mr. Root discuss a most alarming case of this nature, the
attempt of one of the educational imperialists, President Minard Stout of the University of Nevada, to discharge Professor Frank Richardson, because Professor
Richardson obdurately believed in decent standards of scholarship in a university.
Mr. MacIver says that this was ". . . a gross violation of academic rights" (p. 230);
Mr. Root, that the administrators at Nevada were guilty of "militant intolerance." I
may add that my own investigation of present conditions at the Universiy of Nevada
convinces me that-despite Mr. Richardson's being restored to his post by order of
the Nevada Supreme Court-the arrogant policies of President Stout continue in full
force. And we are going to encounter many cases of this nature during the next ten
years, I am afraid.
Professor Ludwig Lewisohn of Brandeis University (quoted by Mr. Root) observes
that "the only scholar, the only type of student who is still forced into a defensive
position on American campuses today is the conservative teacher or student, the
religious teacher or student." (p. 287). I fear that this is going to be increasingly true
of the scholar who believes in conserving the best in liberal education, whatever may
come of the present ideological argument. Early in the history of American academic
freedom, as Messrs. Hofstadter and Metzger point out, the debate entered about
theological questions; then it shifted to the slavery debate; then to Darwinism and
related matters; then to economic discussion; presently to national loyalty; and now
to Communism and radicalism. I think we are entering upon a stern struggle, in the
realm of academic freedom, over the question of the whole meaning of liberal education, closely joined to the question of what is man, and what is human dignity. These
three books, whatever opinion one holds of their authors' convictions, appear at a
time when the gravest attention ought to be given to the first principles of academic
freedom and the mission of the Academy.
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